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STATE Of UTAH
BETTY '.!. GARD0!ER.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

WILL1&'1 JAMES GARDNER,

19246

III,

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by PlaintiffAppellant, Betty X. Gardner, against Defendant-Respondent,
William James Gardner, III.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable
Ronald 0. Hyde presiding, sitting without a jury, granted a
Decree of Divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter referred
to as the "Wife".

Although Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter

referred to as the "Husband", filed an Answer and Counterclaim
,.,

t

lte-se proceedings. he presented no grounds for divorce at

the trial, although it was represented on his behalf that the
case was "not all one-sided" (T. 168).
The familv home,

farm,

and equipment were to be

<ald and the funds received therefrom were divided equally

between the parties.

Additionallv

Wife

1980 Volkswagen, substantiallv all of the l1ol1seholJ furniturt
and furnishings in the familv home. one-third of the proceeds
of the contract for the sale of the old Ogden Clinic building
one-half of a $4,310.00 certificate of deposit at E

F

Hutton, one-half of the proceeds from the sale of boats and
other vehicles, one-half of the proceeds from the sale of
horses and paraphernalia, and her ski equipment and personal
effects.

Husband was awarded a 1981 Subaru automobile, two-

thirds of the proceeds from the contract for the sale of the
old Ogden Clinic building, one-half of the E. F. Hutton
certificate of deposit, the household furniture and furnishings in his apartment, one-half of the proceeds from the
sale of the boats and other vehicles, his ski equipment and
personal effects, and his medical and business assets,
including his retirement funds.
Wife was awarded $1,200.00 per month alimonv,

to

continue until Husband's retirement, at which time the
alimony was to be reduced to $600.00 per month.

The trial

court stated its intent that the alimonv should be paid from
income from Husband's medical practice until he retires. and
from his retirement income after retirement, and should
Husband predecease Wife so that alimonv terminates. Wife was
to have a claim against Husband's estate in the sum of
$50,000.00, with Husband to select the method of securing
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set forth in the Utah
( l 98 2 ) .

The Court made no award of attorney's fees,

in-

j1(ating that the funds Wife received from the contract on
the old Ogden Clinic building. and her share of the E. F.
Hutton money certificate would be available for her use as
actornev's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the
trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not set forth
full? or accurately the evidence which has a bearing on the
issues on appeal.
The parties were married to each other on April 14,
1950 (T

167)

No children were born as issue of the mar-

riage, but the parties adopted two children, both of whom
1re now adults (T

168).

Each party filed a divorce com-

plaint against the other, and the two cases were consolidated
•R

l~)

Husband is a general and vascular surgeon and was

)' ··e3r3 of age at the time of the trial (T
J

1

.ears of age at the time trial (T. 216).

469).

Wife was

Neither of the

aJopted children presently reside at home (T. 203), and
ilwd1anJ is still the sole source of support for the 19-year
old daughter to whom he gives in excess of $300.00 per month

-3 -

plus tuition and books while she attends L:td11
at Logan, Utah (T. 470)

:)l.Lte

:jrt1•1e1

".

Husband intends to continue supportir

said daughter through college (T

471).

Although Husband did not present grounds for divorce
he represented that the case is "not one-sided" (T. 168),
and his complaints against Wife are set forth in his answers
to interrogatories (R. 57-58) wherein he indicated
that problems of communication arose,

each developed different

interests (he as President of the Utah Medical Association
and she as a horse fancier), Wife withdrew physically from
him, causing the marital relationship to deteriorate, and
Wife informed Husband she planned to leave him as soon as
their daughter finished college.
Husband was a Senior in college at the time of the
marriage (T. 170), being three months short of graduation
(T. 495).
Although Wife claims to have worked while Husband
was in medical school and training, Husband also worked
during this period, doing such things as waiting on tables,
construction work cutting lines for a gas company, working
as a mail carrier (T. 205 and 496), working for Campbell Sour
Company (T.

205), participating for pay in R.O.T.C.

(T

497).

submitting to experiments in the Dermatology Department for
pay while in medical school (T. 497). and donating blood
for money as often as he was permitted (T. 497).

-4-

His parents

-

l

,;.;

t•

r .ii" of '.1is tuition through medical school (T. 171

;;:d .:+"S)

Husband also received money from the G. I. Bill

that assisted through graduate work (T. 495).
Wife is in good health (T. 177) but states she
does not want to go to work (T. 177) and that she wants to
direct her attention solely to philanthropic activity without producing any sort of income (T. 219).

She is, however,

capable of employment, having developed good secretarial
skills as the secretary to a college president and as a very
competent executive secretary to a hospital administrator
(T. 207 and 208).
Husband's health is generally good (T. 471),
although he has recently had two separate operations in
connection with the removal of a kidney stone, has had a
number of injuries, including fractures of the leg and
skull, has had an episode of high blood pressure, and has a
non-toxic goiter for which he takes medication and which
causes some concern because of the greater likelihood of
malignancv (T. 472).
The present assets of the parties include the
f Ji

luwing.

(a)

A six-bedroom home, with garages for

four cars, a barn, and other outbuildings situated
on approximately 21 acres of land near Huntsville,
Utah (T. 154, 215-216)
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Also included are several

horses.

rack and.

:C.Jr:-71

approximatel:1 $18.575

L"SL~-;_:;T71.c::'

r)(]

(1

1:--,r'~-1~ ...;L'l'.

There is a

',7fir

mortgage on the real propert·: of

!l

(T

S~0.803.00

13~

with monthlv pavments of $229.00 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.

2).

Several appraisals were made of

the real estate reflecting net value between
$246,000.00 and $280,000.00 (R
ordered that the home.

farm,

105)

The court

and equipment be sold

and that the proceeds be divided equallv between
the parties (R. 110).
(b)

Household furniture and

furnishin~s

in

the family home which Husband testified are worth
$25,000.00 and are insured for $53,000.00 (T. 485)
and which Wife testified are worth $13,710.00
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 through page 5 thereof)
This was awarded to Wife.
(c)

Household furniture in Husband's

possessin~

which he testified has a value of $2,500.00, and
which the court awarded to him (Defendant's
Exhibit 13) .
(d)

A 1980 Volkswagon which

ea~h

of the

parties valued at $4,500.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit
and Defendant's Exhibit 13).

This was awarded to

wife.
(e)

A 1981 Subaru automobile which Husband

-6-

·:al~e0

~t

So,OOU.00 but against which there is a

debt owing to the OGDEN CLINIC PROFIT SHARING PLAN
of $7,436 00 (T

245).

This was awarded to

Husband.
(f)

Boat, motors, canoe, and other motor

vehicles which Wife testified have a value of
$5,374.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) and which Husband
testified have a value of $5,074.00 (Defendant's
Exhibit 13).

These were ordered sold and the

proceeds divided equally between the parties.
(g)

A certificate of deposit at E. F. Hutton

with a value of $4,610.00 (T. 519).

This was

awarded half to each of the parties.
(h)

Ski equipment owned by each party with a

value of $300.00 each.
(i)

Each was awarded his own.

Assets in connection with Husband's

medical practice consist of the following:
1.

100 shares of stock in the OGDEN

CLINIC PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION which the
Administrator of the Clinic and the CPA for
the Clinic both testified have a total value
of $100.00 (T. 254 and T. 407).

The said

professional corporation is made up of 24
physicians (T. 254) and the only assets of
the corporation are the accounts receivable
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and the bank acc·nunt 11
ties consist of rent.

,,re,

i

c=mrl1_;· ep-. ,rnd t•h"sj -ci ir,

salaries. and the contrijutions made hv the
corporation to the phvsicians' profit sharing
plan (T. 406)

The corporation has no other

physical assets

(T. 406).

Both the Clinic

administrator and the CPA for the Clinic also
testified that other doctors have recentlv
left the Clinic and have been entitled to
take nothing with them other than the value
of their stock of $100.00 (T.

258 and 407)

Husband would be entitled to nothing more if
he left the Clinic (T. 258-59 and 407)
Wife's attorney conceded that "there is no
argument with regard to the $100.00 stock
that the doctor owns in the OGDEN CLINIC
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION (T. 438).
2.

OGDEN CLINIC INVESTMENT COMPANY.

This is a general partnership made up of the
same physicians that are shareholders in the
OGDEN CLINIC PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION (T

'>l 1 i1

Its assets consist of the Clinic huilding,
the land immediatelv under the building.

the

parking lot, and the medical equipment used
by the phvsicians (T

-8 -

410)

Its liabilities

1,· ,1_

·)f

"!-'1e

ciortgage on the building and

real propertv and the notes owing for the
purchase of equipment (T. 410).

The net

worth of Husband in this entity, as carried
on its books, is a minus $11,304.00

(T. 261

and 412 and Defendant's Exhibit 3).

None of

the partners has ever had a draw from this
partnership and they have had to subsidize it
several times in the past ten years (T. 416).
There is a buy-out provision in the partnership agreement which governs the amount each
physician would receive should he withdraw
from the partnership (T. 262) and under that
provision, two doctors who recently left
each received $3,726.26 for their interest
(T. 263) and the CPA for the partnership
testified that this was determined to be the
value of each partner's interest shortly
before the trial (T. 416 and Defendant's
Exhibit 5).
An interest in OLD POST ROAD
DE\'ELOP~!E~lT

COMPANY

This is a partnership

made up of part of the Ogden Clinic physicians
and the former Clinic Administrator (T. 264).
It owns commercial property adjacent to the
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Ogden Clinic bu11.ding lT

~04 1

recent records of this entitv

~how

the book

value of Husband's equitv to be $441.00
(Defendant's Administrator and the CPA for
this entity testified that the market value
of Husband's equitv is a maximum of $12,500.00
(T. 267 and 425), but the said CPA testified
that she would not buy anybody's interest in
this investment due to the poor economic
situation and the fact that if the tenant of
the building (Carriage House Furniture Store)
cannot make the rental of $7,500.00 per
month, the individual partners are going to
have to make a mortgage payment of that
amount (T. 424).

Since the trial, the tenant

has, in fact, defaulted on its lease and the
partners are having to make the monthly
mortgage payment.
4.

A promissory note to Husband from

the old OGDEN CLINIC BUILDING CORPORATION.
This represents Husband's share of the building
previously occupied by Ogden Clinic (T. 24b1
The balance owing on said note is $16,325.00,
with payments being made to Husband of $192.55
per month, with interest at 12 per cent per

-10-

c·e11c

per annum (T.

246-247),

The CPA for

the Clinic testified that this note will be
worth less than $16,000.00 if interest rates
go up (T

419). Husband testified that he

would be willing to sell this asset "in a
flash" for $16, 000. 00 (T. 490),

The trial

court granted one-third of this note to Wife
and two-thirds to Husband (R. 111).
5.

An interest in the OGDEN CLINIC

PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN, also known
as the OGDEN CLINIC RETIREMENT TRUST.

The

books of the trust reflect that as of
December 31, 1981, Husband's share was
$101,285.25 (T. 241 and 426), and that he
has a loan against this account for the purchase of an automobile, with a balance of
$7,436.00 (T,

245 and 430).

Husband must

actually retire or terminate his employment
in order to be entitled to anything under the
plan (T. 268), and the normal retirement age
anticipated by the plan is age 65, which is
10 vears away for Husband (T. 268 and 269).
Under the plan, the trustees have the option
to direct that a retiring physician will be
paid over a period of time, rather than in

-11-

a lump sum (T.

~b:I

anJ

-+~

i

1

the plan is non-income producing IT
447).

~27

anJ

Doctors who have retired or terminated

have asked for their funds,

but due to problems

in the plan, have not been paid (T. 429). The
Clinic Administrator testified that the
recent market value of the assets of the plan
are below what the carrving value is on the
books (T. 271) and that the value of the plan
has actually been depreciating (T. 2 72) .

The

CPA for the Ogden Clinic testified that in
view of the fact that Husband will not be
entitled to any of the funds until his retirement in 10 years, and that at that time the
trustees may elect to pay his share out over
a period of many years, the present value of
Husband's interest in the retirement trust is
approximately $40,969.00 (T. 432).
6.

Additional retirement benefits from

Ogden Clinic.

The by-laws of the Clinic set

out a formula which provides that upon retirement, a physician is entitled to receive as
additional retirement benefits a sum equivalent to four months of the average salarv he
received during his last two vears of emplo'rrnent

-12-

·.'1i:::h tice Clinic (T

392).

This asset is

highb speculative (T. 429 and 493), inasmuch
as a phvsician is not entitled to receive it
if he practices medicine within an area of 30
miles of the Ogden Clinic (T. 393), and the
asset is completely unfunded (T. 493 and

434) .

This asset is even more speculative

because of legal complications wherein the
by-laws of the Clinic regarding this asset
conflict with the by-laws of the PENSION AND
PROFIT SHARING PLAN, and there are attempts
to resolve this being made by attorneys for
the Clinic and Retirement Trust (T. 435).
Nothing has ever been paid out under this
provision to any physicians who have retired
or terminated their employment with the Ogden
Clinic (T. 436).

Husband has placed no value

on this item because of its speculative
nature (T. 438).
The trial court concluded that the medical assets
and retirement of Husband are basically futuristic and will
i1a"e to be utilized at retirement

(R. 97-98 and R. 105).

These assets were awarded to Husband, with the exception
that Wife was awarded one-third of the account from the sale of

-13-

the old Ogden Clinic building (R

lllJ

Husband's 1981 income ·,vas S70,728
an average of $5,894.00 per month,

111)

rT

••r

.+rl8l

and the estimate of his

CPA that his 1982 income would probablv be between $70,000.00
to $80,000.00 (T. 409) was based upon the fact that two
doctors had recently left the Clinic,

leaving approximatelv

$200,000.00 in accounts receivable to be disbursed to the
remaining doctors, which would account for as much as a
$10,000.00 increase in each of their salaries for the vear
1982, but this would be a one-time increase (T. 409).
Wife was awarded $1,200.00 per month alimony to
continue until Husband's retirement, at which time it was
reduced to $600.00 per month, with it being the intent of
the trial court that the alimony should be paid from the
income from defendant's medical practice until he retires
and from retirement income after retirement, and should
Husband predecease Wife so that alimony terminates, Wife
should have a claim a8ainst Husband's estate in the sum of
$50,000.00, with that claim being secured bv Husband through
the alternatives set forth in the Utah case of Dogu v.

Dogu,

652 P2d 1308, as would best serve Husband's tax position
(R.

112),

-14-

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ALL
PERn;;nn CIRCUMSTAclCES AND MADE AN EQUITABLE
DIVISION OF THE XARITAL ESTATE
In the Utah case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P2d 6

11982). this court stated:
"Although this Court may weigh the evidence
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court in divorce actions, Hendricks v. Hendricks,
91 Utah 553, 63 P2d 277 (1936), this Court will
not do so lightly merely because its judgment may
differ from that of the trial judge, MacDonald v.
MacDonald, Supra.
See Mccrary v. McCrary, Utah,
599 P2d 1248 (1979).
A trial court's apportionment of marital property will not be disturbed
unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion
Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P2d 1380 (1980); Naylor v.
Naylor, Utah, 563 P2d 184 (1977) . "
The Wife has not established such a manifest injustice
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion in
this case.

The trial court correctly found that the

·~arties

primarv asset is their home, farm and equipment in the valley"
(R

97),

and that "one thing that is evident is the assets of

the parties cannot be divided so that the plaintiff can stay
in the family home"

(R. 97).

This is reasonable in view of

the fact that both of the children have now left home and
::e 'd-vear old \Vife does not need,
•~e

and cannot practically

and maintain, a six-bedroom home with garages for four

vehicles, a barn, outbuildings, farm equipment, several
horses which she does not ride, and 21 acres of land.

-15 -

The

their "primary asset" so that each
with which to begin anew.

hci~

substanlial assets

Eased on \-iite's

O\•m

evidence. she

leaves the marriage with assets in excess of $150,000.00 in
value.

Husband values those same assets at in excess of

$180,000.00.
It was appropriate for the trial court to order
that wife be permitted to remain in the home until it is
sold and make the mortgage payment of $229.00 per month,
together with taxes and insurance from the $1,200.00 per
month alimony she receives.

The real property was,

in fact,

sold within a few months after the granting of the divorce,
so that Wife was responsible for those expenses for only a
short time.
Wife brought no assets into the marriage, and with
the exception of the medical assets and retirement benefits
which will be discussed hereafter, she is leaving the marriage
with over one-half of the marital assets.

POINT II
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND DISPOSITION OF ~EDICAL
ASSETS AND RETIREMENT FUNDS MADE BY THE TRIAL
COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
This case is remarkably similar to the Utah case
of Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P2d 1308 (1982), which case was tried
by the same District Court Judge and bv the same attorneys
handling this appeal.

That case also involved a marriage of

-16 -

·"' ·1

ii1r.iti.1n 12-+ :1ears) between a physician and his

1n~mploved

e4n~l

spouse,

in which the trial court made an essentially

division of the parties' property, excluding the

Husband's medical assets (a professional corporation) and
his retirement funds of $86, 730.00, both of which were awarded
to him.

Dr. Dogu's income was $108,675.00 the year prior to

the divorce and the trial court awarded alimony of $1,500.00
per month, which was reduced to $750.00 per month at the
time of the doctor's retirement.

The alimony award of

$1,200.00 per month in the present case, based upon Husband's
income the year prior to the divorce of $70,728.00, which is
to be reduced to $600.00 per month upon retirement, is fair
and equitable when compared to the alimony award in the Dogu
case.

This is particularly true in view of the fact that

wife in this case filed an affidavit in an order to show
cause proceeding setting forth her total monthly living expenses at $1,648.00 (T. 6) of which $125.00 was attributable
to farm animal care and $100.00 to farm maintenance, both of
which expenses no longer exist, and $300.00 which she claimed
was attributable to child tuition and school expenses, all
of which were at the time, and now are, being paid
h · Husband (T

470).

After deducting these expenses which

are no longer applicable ($525.00) from Wife's stated needs
of $1,648.00. her actual needs are $1,123.00 per month.
Should she desire,

she is free to supplement this income by

-17-

obtaining employment.

Considering her

~tall·

·'l

2•>uJ

hc·.i!L:1

and her prior experience as a competent executive secretarv,
she should be able to do so without great difficultv.

Such

an option was recognized by this Court in the case of Warren
v. Warren, 655 P2d 684, Utah (1982) where upon termination
of a 27-year marriage, the Husband, with a $40,000.00 per
year income, was ordered to pay $400.00 per month alimony
for a period of four years when the alimony terminated.
This Court pointed out, on page 688, that "plaintiff is free
to supplement this income by accepting full-time or parttime employment."

With her substantial assets and $1,200.00

per month alimony, Wife in the present case was treated far
more equitably than was the wife in the Warren case.
Wife's position in her appeal brief that Husband's
alleged fault in this marriage should be a factor considered
by the Court in setting alimony and determining distribution
of property, is erroneous.

In the case of Jesperson v.

Jesperson, 610 P2d 326, Utah,

(1980), this Court ruled that

the trial court improperly considered marital misconduct in
making the property division.

On page 328, the Court stated

"We have previously held that a trial court
must consider many factors in making a propert·:
settlement in the divorce proceeding, but the
purpose of the settlement should not be to impose
punishment on either party."
(citing Read v.
Read, Utah, 594 P2d 871 (1979).

-18-

In
+Wl

l~e

case of English v. English, Utah, 565 P2d

!1977). this Court stated, at page 411:
"The purpose of alimony is
for the wife and not to inflice
on the husband.
Alimony is not
penalty against the husband nor

to provide support
punitive damages
intended as a
a reward to the wife."

The award of the medical assets and retirement benefits to Husband was proper and was consistent with the Court's
holding in the Dogu case (Supra).

Wife proposed that these

assets be awarded to Husband in her proposed division of assets
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 19), but she carried them at grossly overinflated values.

Her accountant testified that in his opinion

the value of Husband's interest in OLD POST ROAD DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY was $16, 777. 00 (T. 371), notwithstanding the testimony
of the Clinic Administrator that the Clinic was at that very
time undertaking the purchase of a partnership interest twofifths the size of Husband's for $5,000.00, making the value of
Husband's interest $12,500.00 (T. 266).
An even more gross error was made by Wife's accountant in valuing Husband's interest in OGDEN CLINIC INVES™ENT
COMPANY at $34, 041. 00 (T.

373).

He went on to state that

under the partnership agreement Husband (wouldn't be able to
'.et

r-hat value today)

(T

373).

The fact is that there is a

buv-out provision in the partnership agreement which clearly
determines the value of a partner's interest (T. 262) and
Lhe testimony of the Clinic's Administrator was that under
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the formula, two doctors who had .\ ust recen! l
Clinic were each paid $3,726.26 for their interest, clearlv
establishing the market value of each partnership interest.
Wife's accountant attempted to value the retirement trust at $119,921.00 by interpolating an 18.4 per cent
increase in the fund over the previous vear.

His reasoning

was:
"Not knowing what the valuation is going
to be at the end of December of this vear, I
felt maybe the 18.4 per cent increase.mi~ht be
fair in 1982." (T. 374) (emphasis added
The testimony of the Clinic's CPA and its Administrator was
much more realistic in pointing out that even the book value
of Husband's interest in the retirement plan ($101, 285. 00) was
not the present market value thereof in view of the fact that
it is not payable for 10 years and even then, the trustees
could extend the pay-out over several years after retirement
(T. 269 and T. 432).

Wife also failed to take into account

that there is a debt of almost $8,000 00 against the retirement fund for the purchase of Husband's automobile.

A far

more accurate figure of $40,969.00 was given by the CPA for
the Clinic as the present value of Husband's interest in the
retirement plan (T. 432).
The supplementary retirement provision in the
Clinic By-Laws has been previously discussed herein, and due
to its speculative nature, legal complications involved
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c 1',

cJnJ

, ~i1,

c_,1c

fact that none of the doctors who have

,,rc:"iousl? left the Clinic were even paid under this provision,
1

s dpprnpriately valued as zero,
A final example of erroneous testimony by Wife's

accountant was given regarding the value of the Ogden Clinic
building note which has an unpaid balance of approximately

?16,329,00,

Wife's accountant placed a present market value

on said note of $34,650.00 on the basis that that is the
amount with interest that would be paid out on the note over
its lifetime (T.

395).

He finally admitted on cross-examination

that neither he nor anyone else in their right mind would
pav that price for it, however (T. 396).

Obviously it is not

worth more than its face amount, and not even that if interest
rates go up,
The value of the medical assets set forth in
Defendant's Exhibit 18 of $73,874.00 was established by the
testimony of the CPA for the Ogden Clinic and the Clinic's
Administrator and are far more realistic than the value of

$231, 942. 00 placed by Wife's accountant on the same assets.
The trial court was correct in finding that the medical
assets and retirement are "futuristic" in nature and will be
cl

i l i zed at

retirement,

This was similar to the situation

in the Dogu case (Supra) wherein a fixed amount was in the
retirement fund, which would be available for use by the
HusbanJ in paying the alimony after retirement.
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The concern

provision for the protection of Lhe wife in the event the
husband died, thereby terminating the alimonv

The court

stated, however, at page 1310 as follows
"If the decree had been drawn so that this marital
asset [his retirement funds] would assure pavment
of alimony in all events, it would be well within the bounds of discretion on the facts of this
case. 11
The same trial judge was keenly aware of such a potential
deficiency in the present case and corrected it bv providing
that in the event of Husband's death, Wife will have a claim
against his estate in the sum of $50,000.00.

This will be

payable to Wife whether Husband dies before or after retirement and Husband may select the method of securing this
claim through the alternatives set forth in the Dogu case.
The holding of the case of Woodward v. Woodward.
Utah, 565 P2d 431 (1982) cited by Wife is not applicable in
this case.

That case contemplated a regular and consistent

setting aside of a certain amount of each of Husband's
monthly paychecks for retirement, and therefore lends itself
to the application of a formula based upon the number of
years husband was married to wife accruing retirement benefits in relation to the total number of years husband would
have accrued such benefits by the time he actuallv retires.
Such a formula is not appropriate in the present case where
the amount going into the retirement fund in anv given vear
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:r ~1~ '.:'.a:c · ::.1ctor". including the success of the
· -~-~ cind its need to use income for other expenses
The decision of the trial court to reduce the
cilimonv to $600 00 per month at the time of retirement was
cippropriate and based upon his sound reasoning that by the
'ime of retirement the home should be sold (which has alreadv occurred) and the Wife should have liquid assets;
Hubband's income will materially decrease; and Wife will
also receive social security benefits (R.

99),

POINT III
AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSETS DOES
NOT REQUIRE AN AWARD TO WIFE OF HUSBAND'S
PROSPECTIVE EARNINGS.
Although in the trial of this case, Wife made no
claim to, nor presented any evidence in support of, an award
of the prospective earnings of Husband, her Point II now makes
such a claim.

She now contends, as an apparent afterthought,

that she has a property interest in the medical degree and
~usiness

of the doctor which gives her a claim to his prospec-

tive earnings
It should first be pointed out that the majority
.1se' considering the question of whether the professional
~e~ree

constitutes marital property, involve marriages of

short duration where the wife works to put a husband through
o

c lwu l and short 1 v aft er graduation, before the degree has

~enerated

anv improvement in their standard of living, the
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the professional degree

Had the monies earned bv the

~ife

been used for the acquisition of phvsical assets, rather than
invested in the degree, there would, of course. have been
assets to be divided.
The present case is quite different, however,

in

that the medical degree which was acquired with considerable
toil and sacrifice by Husband and his parents, as well as the
contribution of Wife, has produced a substantial harvest,
the benefits of which Wife has enjoyed for some 25 years
since she terminated employment in 1958.

This affluence has

made possible a very nice lifestyle (T. 213), a .<=>;reat deal of
entertaining (T. 183), the owning of a "magnificant home" in
east Ogden (T. 183). and the ultimate acquisition of a
country estate in Ogden Valley (T. 215).
marriage,

She now leaves the

sharing in a very sizeable estate, and receiving

$1,200.00 per month alimony, which is far more than is
awarded to the wife in most divorce situations.

She has long

since been more than compensated for her share of the contribution to the acquisition of the medical degree.
The cases cited by Wife do not support her claim to
a property interest in the medical degree and business of
Husband.

The Colorado case of In Re

~arriage

of Nichols,

606 P2d 1314 (1979) cited bv Wife, holds that good will associated with the private practice of a dentist mav be
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.,, 1.Jered mdri tal oropert:/, subject to division where the
altle thereof is established by the testimony of an expert.
In the present case, Husband does not have his own private

practice which could be sold or transferred to another, but
rather he is a member of a professional clinic where he
would be prohibited from transferring his practice.

Upon

withdrawing from the Clinic, he would not even be entitled
to his accounts receivable, let alone any element of good
will

Wife has in no way attempted to·produce any evidence

as to the value of any alleged good will.
The Kansas case she cites of Williams v. Williams,
548 P2d 794 (1976) has no applicability.

It merely states

certain criteria followed in Kansas in determining the
question of alimony, and holds that under Kansas law the
relative fault of the parties and the gravity of their
transgressions will be considered in determining the extent
of alimony.

This is not the law in Utah, as evidenced by

the Jesperson and English cases hereinbefore cited.
The Oklahoma case of Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P2d
n~3

(1977) cited bv Wife is easily distinguished from the
That case involved a marriage of approximately

,even vears and at the time of the divorce, the Husband was
less than six months from graduation from medical school.
Wife had been the principal breadwinner during the last five
·:ears of the marriage and the total income she produced
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during t:-ie mar"!:"iage '.-Jas

produced by the husband.

sever3l Limes

-:r1...,1'._1...·1

Recog;nizing chi;.

·~1:

the 1Jklcihom;i

Court gave her a lump sum alimon-; award of Sl5.1)1JO.OO.
payable in monthly installments.

In the present case, the

total income produced during the marriage by Husband is
many, manv times greater than that produced during the same
period by Wife.

Furthermore, the divorce took place some 25

years after the Wife last worked and after Husband had,
through his own personal efforts and sacrifice, accumulated
a very substantial estate in which Wife is now sharing

The

Wife in Colvert had no such estate in which to share.
The Arizona case of In Re

~arriage

of Goldstein,

583 P2d 1343 (1978) cited by Wife does not support her
present claim.

That case merely held that the accounts

receivable of the professional corporation owned bv the
physician husband can appropriately be treated as a marital
asset and need not be reduced bv an overhead allowance.
This is contrarv to the holding in the Utah case of Dogu
v. Dogu (Supra) wherein this Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the accounts
receivable of Dr. Dogu's professional corporation do not
constitute a marital asset, but rather "represent defer-reJ
income from which Respondent mav meet his ongoing alimonv
and child support obligation to Appellant"
of decision)
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(See page 1309

ihcc Lase uf Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P2d 1380

JSU) cited bv Wife held that it was not an abuse of discretion bv the trial court in awarding 4S per cent of the
rn.Jrital estate to husband and SS per cent to wife (based on
·.vife's valuations) where there had been a lengthy marriage
and wife had worked while husband was in dental school, but
one of the significant factors considered by the court in
making such an award was that the wife had contributed
$1S,OOO of her own funds to the acquisition of marital
assets.
Wife cites the Arizona case of Mori v. Mori, 603
P~d

8S (1979) for the proposition that accounts receivable

of the husband's professional corporation constituted
marital assets.
viously.

That issue has already been discussed pre-

Of greater significance is the fact that in the

Mori case, husband was earning $S,OOO.OO per month from his
law practice and his wife was awarded $1,000.00 per month
maintenance for one year.

She did not dispute the amount of

the maintenance, but argued that it was an abuse of discret

i·rn for the maintenance to be terminated in one year.

The

.\rizona Supreme Court agreed and held that where the wife
.as 52 vears of age and had been married for almost 25
··ears, with no previous employment record other than teachrng for six months in 1950 while her husband was in law

,•chool, the $1, 000 00 per month maintenance order should
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continue for a period of three
comparison of the

~ori

~ears

and •hen

ler~inar~

support order with the present case

where Wife was awarded $1,200 00 per month alimonv until
Husband's retirement and then $600.00 per month permanentl
thereafter, shows the verv adequate nature of the alimonv
award in the present case.
Of particular significance

regardin~

Wife's claim

that she has a property interest in the medical degree of
Husband, is the Colorado case of In Re Marriage of Anne P
Graham, 574 P2d 75 (1978) where the wife argued that inasmuch
as she contributed 70 per cent of the financial support
which was used for family expenses and for her husband's
education in obtaining a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Engineering and Physics and a Masters Decree in Business
Administration during their six-year marriage, she acquired
a property right in his degree.

The Colorado Supreme Court

disagreed and stated as follows·
"An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is
simply not encompassed even bv the broad views of
the concept of 'property.'
It does not have an
exchange value or any objective transferable value
on an open market.
It is personal to the holder.
It terminates on death of the holder and is not
inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged.
A~ advanced degree
is a cumulative product cf many vears of previous
education, combined with diligence and hard work
It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of
money.
It is simply an intellectual achievement
that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of propertv.
In our view, it has none of
the attributes of propertv in the usual sense of
that term."
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l'k

:olorado Court went on to state:

1

"Our interpretation is in accord with cases
ln '"her jurisdictions
We have ~een unable to
find anv decision, even in community property
states, which appears to have held that an education of one spouse is marital property to be
divided on dissolution.
This contention was
dismissed in Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 78
Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct.App.), where it was held that a
law degree is not a community property asset
capable of division, partly because it 'cannot
have monetary value placed upon it.'
Similarly,
it has been recently held that a person's earning
capacity, even where enhanced by a law degree
financed by the other spouse, 'should not be
recognized as a separate, particular item of
property.'
Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d

2 5 7."

POINT IV
WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AWARD OF ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES
In the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL section of Wife's
brief, she states she is seeking an award of attorney's
fees,

but said brief cites no evidence in support of the

need for such fees, nor does it present any legal argument
in support of such an award.
Wife presented no evidence at trial to establish
a need for attorney's fees and there was no testimony by
lier

attornev as to the number of hours that had been spent
·lie •.ase,

en

tl1e

or anv indication of an hourly rate charged.

case of Warren v. Warren,

(Supra) the Utah Supreme

Court stated as follows:
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"Plai~c:.::

shoT. . 1.

ct-:e

:tatu!_'"e
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incurred in litigating the oresent

need for court-ordered

t:"

~l:'.e.-,

ice on or 8nv
1.ss is ta:-ice : ~1 t e :-ia·.rr:lent

of such fees.
Ctah law clearlv requires presentation of such evidence in order to support an
attornev fee award.
The trial court therefore
properlj denied plaintiff's request for such
fees."
Although the trial court did not make an award of
attornev's fees as such, he did consider that matter and
made a specific finding that Wife could use her share of the
E. F. Hutton money certificate and her share of the proceeds
from the sale of the old Ogden Clinic building to assist in
paying her attorney's fees

(R. 111).

He no doubt recognized

that she was receiving a verv substantial property award in
addition.
As stated in the case of Kerr v. Kerr, Utah,
(Supra):
"The decision to make such an award [referring to
attorney's fees], together with the amount thereof,
rests primarilv with the sound discretion of the
trial court."
The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding
Wife's attorney's fees in this case.
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The trial court was correct in finding that the
principal asset of the parties was their country estate, consisting of an expensive six-bedroom home, barn and outbuildings. equipment, boats, horses and acreage. and that the only
practical way to divide this asset was to direct that it be
sold and the proceeds be divided equally between the parties.
The court also correctly awarded the medical assets and retirement to Husband, finding that they are futuristic in
nature.

The court correctly recognized that these assets are

necessary for Husband to produce the income with which he pays
the alimony of $1,200.00 per month until retirement, and that
they, along with the retirement benefits to which Husband will
be entitled should he survive his retirement date, will be
utilized to pay the permanent alimony of $600.00 per month
after retirement.

The court appropriately made provision for

the contingency that Husband might predecease Wife, by providing that she will be entitled to a claim against his estate
of 350,000.00 in such event.
It was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court
_,., '.Jiling to grant Wife a property interest in Husband's
medical degree and his prospective earnings, inasmuch as such
request bv Wife was never made at the trial, and circumstances
0f this case would not so warrant in any event.
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The refusal

of appropriate provision havin·'( he en TlLie ol :1cr···'' se, cs not
an abuse of discretion bv the

~ourt

The judgment and decree of the trial court should
therefore be affirmed
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